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TOURIST HOMES AND CABINS AS INNS
By LYMAN H. COLE*
The growing popularity of travel by automobile has
demanded the development of additional and somewhat dif-
ferent resort accommodations than those utilized by the
business or pleasure seeking visitor to a city. Thus fertilized
by necessity the property owners along the automobile trails
have labored. Home owners have placed their second best
furniture in the spare room and erected a sign by the highway,
"Tourist Rooms", or perhaps something more enticing such
as "Twilight Rest House", done in colors. Cabins in varying
degrees of artistic taste and luxury have been constructed
under cool trees and the blistering sun, in green grass and
choking dust. Pasture lots have been converted into camp-
ing grounds for the trailer and tent where the occupant may
be supplied with electricity and grills or perhaps left unaided
to make his peace with nature. The horizon of billboards
is obstructed with instructions to "Slow Down for Jake's
Cabins" or "Hurry to the Lone Pine Tourist Home."'
*Professor of Law at Indiana Law School.
I Statistics on the extent of the new tourist accomodation business are con-
flicting. There are some twenty to thirty thousand cabin camps in the country
representing a capital investment of a quarter of a billion dollars. They have
increased 1,000% in 15 years. New York Times, Sept. 1, 1935, p. 13. There
are some 200,000 private homes offering tourist accommodations. Ibid. There
are 16,411 cabin camps operating 166,062 cottages. The camps are increasing
at the rate of 500 a year. Business Week, Feb. 8, 1936, p. 31. Government
survey, admittedly incomplete, reports 11,257 tourist cabins and camps. There
are 1,440 in California alone. U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Census, Census 1935, Tourist Camps. Reported that over 400,000 "shacks"
erected for auto tourists over four year period; an investment of over sixty
million dollars. The Architectural Record, Dec. 1933, p. 457. It has been
reported that there are 10,000 tourist cabin camps. The average five-cabin
camp represents an investment of $20,000. Approximately 25% of the cabins
are equipped for cooking. Hardware Age, Apr. 11, 1935, p. 46f. A. A. A.
Official Directory of Cottages, Camps, Courts and Inns, 1933, lists 4,000
approved camps. The extent of the new business is illustrated by two former
hotel men who erected 102 tourist "apartments". They have enjoyed 80%
occupancy in the winter and 100% in the summer. They have had a net
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As yet the courts appear to have been bothered but little
with the problems arising between the proprietor of these
establishments and the tourist who patronizes him,2 but it is
inevitable that questions will arise when the proprietor turns
the weary tourist from his door, when the tourist's luggage
or automobile is stolen, when the tourist is injured, when the
proprietor desires to rid himself of a guest, or where the
proprietor prefers to retain the luggage of the tourist rather
than accept his check.
The solution to these and similar problems will be governed
to a material degree by determining the relationship which
exists between the proprietor and tourist. Which volume
of his encyclopedia or digest shall the lawyer consult in
determining the existing rights, powers, privileges and immun-
ities? The attorney is confronted with an arrangement where
the property of one is being occupied by another with the
consent of the former. Such situations are treated under the
legal titles of Landlord and Tenant, Innkeeper and Guest,
Lodging House Keeper and Lodger, and Licensor and
Licensee.3  The element of consent to the occupancy renders
profit of $30,000 per year. Hotel Management, June, 1930, p. 543ff. The
popular price for a cabin, two persons, is one dollar per day. Some charge
only fifty cents and a few have rates as high as nine dollars. Business Week,
Feb. 8, 1936, p. 31. For figures showing the competition between these new
tourist accommodations and established hotels, see infra note 49.
Ernest F. Hodgson, builder of anything from a "whelping pen to a tenroom
house" takes credit as being the founder of the tourist camp. Catalogue of
Hodgson Houses, 1935, E. F. Hodgson, Co., Dover, Mass. The first tourist
cabin was built in Douglas, Arizona, in 1913. Business Week, Feb. 1936, p. 31.
2The question is raised in Brown, Personal Property (1936) p. 440. For
a discussion of the only reported case the author has found on the subject, see
infra note 3.
a In Crockett v. Troyk et al, - Tex. Civ. App. -, 78 S. W. (2d) 1012
(1935), there was an action for injuries to a tourist as a result of an explosion
of a gas stove. The court assumed that the relationship of innkeeper and guest
existed: (p. 1012) "Appellee . . . sued appellant . . . and recovered
judgment for $4,000 as damages resulting from injuries received by appellee
in a gas explosion, which occurred in the tourist cabin of appellant 'while the
relation of innkeeper and guest existed between them." (Author's italics).
The court then 'relies upon this premise in determining the sufficiency of the
plaintiff's evidence: (p. 1014) "It is also well settled, both at common law
and by the decisions of this country, that, where a guest has proved use by
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
it improbable that the tourist will be considered a trespasser.
It is possible that in solving these problems by statute or
judicial legislation a new pigeonhole will be created as a
repository for rules different from those applied under the
labels above mentioned, but undoubtedly at the first the judi-
cial approach will seek a solution by applying the rules estab-
lished under the titles mentioned above.
It is not the object of this paper to forecast the ultimate
holdings of any court in a particular controversy. At the
present it is sufficient to deal with the first step that must
be taken when litigation arises between the proprietor of
these new accommodations and the tourist, namely, from
which existing legal subject shall rules be selected.- A definite
answer will not be attempted, but only a consideration of the
factors which may influence the court's determination.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
In distinguishing a tenant from other occupants of prop-
erty it is frequently said that he has an interest in the realty
while the others have not," but such a statement is of little
help; it describes a result rather than pointing out an aid to
discovering it. Of greater utility in the present problem is
the fact that the tenant's occupancy is generally characterized
by exclusive control and obligation to keep the property in
an innkeeper of unsafe and defective gas fixtures, and appliances, in conse-
quence of which gas has escaped, causing injury to the guest, he has established
a prima facie case of negligence against the innkeeper."
The author has corresponded with the counsel of both litigants in this
case and had an opportunity to examine some of the briefs. Counsel for the
appellee state that it was never seriously disputed that the innkeeper-guest
relationship existed. Some innkeeper cases are cited in the appellee's brief,
but there is no analysis of the assumption. Counsel for the appellant state that
the innkeeper-guest question did not arise until appeal and the appellant only
sought to have the issue disregarded as being improperly raised at that time.
4 No attempt will be made here to discuss the different rules applicable
under any particular subject. The governing principles of each are, in
general, well established and readily available in any standard encyclopedia
or text.
6.35 C. J. 951 (1924-).
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its proper condition. 7 The creation of the tenancy is com-
monly attended with formalities."
Seldom are these elements present when the tourist takes
a room in a tourist home, or occupies a cabin, or parks his
trailer on a lot. Certainly exclusive possession or responsi-
bility for the upkeep are not within the expressed understand-
ing, nor can they ordinarily be implied in fact. However, it
seems quite possible that the tourist, even when occupying a
room in a tourist home, may become a tenant as this result
has been reached in regard to a "traveler" in an establishment
recognized as an inn ;9 but in the absence of definite expression
this will seldom occur except where the occupancy has been
or is to be of considerable duration.' 0
Where the premises occupied are separate and apart from
other land or buildings, as the cabin or camping ground, there
is a closer objective analogy to the typical landlord and tenant
case. But even here the distinctions in the permanency of the
occupation, the lack of formalities, the limited use anticipated,
and the absence of responsibility are all factors bidding
strongly for the rejection of the landlord and tenant relation-
ship in the typical situation of the tourist and his host.
7 Marden v. Radford, 229 Mo. App. 789 84 S. W. (2d) 947 (1935). The
proprietor's retention of keys, right of supervision and inspection, and care of
furnishings and equipment are important factors in determining the relation
of lodger rather than tenant. Carroll v. Cooney, 116 Conn. 112, 163 At. 599
(1933). The fact that the occupants took charge of their rooms in the hotel
by cleaning them, furnishing linen, and making the beds, indicates a tenant
relationship rather than that of innkeeper and guest. Murray v. Hagens,
175 La. 813, 143 So. 505 (1932).
8 For discussion of characteristics generally of landlord and tenant relation-
ship see I Underhill, Law of Landlord and Tenant (1909) sec. 199, I McAdam,
Landlord and Tenant, (4th ed. 1910) sec. 42.
9 Mathews v. Livingston, 86 Conn. 263, 85 Atl. 529 (1912).
30 DeWolf v. Ford, 193 N. Y. 397, 86 N. E. 527 (1908). "While there can
be a tenancy of real estate in a single room, or in furnished rooms; yet this
can only be created by clear terms of the demise." I Taylor, Landlord and
Tenant, 87f. For discussion of the relationship of a permanent occupant of an
apartment in a hotel. Marden v. Radford, 229 Mo. App. 789, 84 S. W. (2d)
947 (1935). See also supra note 8.
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LODGER OR GUEST
Not all persons occupying the property of another are
relegated to the classification of bare licensees if they fail to
qualify as tenants. Between them and the owner or pro-
prietor may exist the relation of innkeeper and guest or lodg-
ing house keeper and lodger; 11 the rights and duties therein
involved differing considerably from that of landlord and
tenant.12  In view of the fact that these relationships have
been held to exist only where sleeping accommodations,' 3 at
least are supplied it would appear that the tourist camping
ground would be beyond the pale of either a lodging
house or inn. Thus, a process of .elimination suggests that
ordinarily the trailer occupant or camper will be declared
licensee. 14 However, it may be a blind justice which will
classify a luxurious camping ground ,beneath a cabin which
offers no more protection and comfort than canvas covering
and an army cot.' 5
11 On the distinction generally between lodgers, guests, and tenants, see
Mathews v. Livingston, 86 Conn. 263, 85 At. 529 (1912); DeWolf v. Ford,
119 App. Div. 808, 104+ N. Y. S. 876, rev'd 193 N. Y. 397, 86 N. E. 527 (1908).
The term boarding house keeper and boarder is frequently used. No
distinction appears to be drawn generally as to law applicable to establishments
technically boarding houses or lodging houses.
12 At common law the business of an innkeeper is quasi-public, invested
with many privileges and burdened with correspondingly great responsibilities.
DeWolf v. Ford, 193 N: Y. 297, 86 N. E. 527 (1908). The extraordinary
liability of an innkeeper is not based strictly in tort or contract, but arises
from the public profession. Keener, Law of Quasi-Contract (1893) p. 18.
3 Holdsworth, History of English Law, (1923) 385. On innkeeper law gen-
erally, see Brown, Personal Property, (1936) sec. 102-106; Elliot, Bailments
and Carriers, (1914) ch. VII; Goddard, Bailments and Carriers (2d ed. 1928)
ch. IX.
'a Lewis v. Hitchcock, 10 Fed. 4 (1882). Cromwell v. Stephens, 2 Daly
15 (N. Y. 1867). Where food without lodging is offered the establishment
is not an inn. Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 I1. 578, 45 N. E. 253 (1896).
A bath-house is not an inn. Walpert v. Bohan, 126 Ga. 532, 55 S. E. 181
(1906).
14 Statutory regulations in Florida group tourist cabins and camps. Com-
piled General Laws of Florida (1927) sec. 4140.
15 The difficulty of drawing a line between camping grounds and hotels
is illustrated by the accommodations furnished tourists at Yellowstone National
Park. At the top, at least in price, is the standard hotel. Second, there is
the "inn" where the traveler has an individual cabin, linen and heat supplied.
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In view of the fact that where sleeping accommodations
are furnished, and the relation of landlord and tenant is not
established, the status of proprietor and occupant has gen-
erally been held that of innkeeper and guest or lodging house
keeper and lodger, it is probable that the tourist home and
cabin will be classified under one of these titles. In dis-
tinguishing the lodger from the guest the judicial approach
has been deductive. The court will test the particular facts
by the innkeeper-guest requirements and if found wanting
conclude the relationship to be that of lodging house keeper
and lodger. Such shall be the present procedure. The crea-
tion of the innkeeper-guest relationship requires the presence
of certain essentials on behalf of both parties. If either is
found wanting the relationship is destroyed regardless of the
sufficiency of the other's qualifications.
The sole requirement imposed upon the guest is that he
shall be 'a traveler 17 partaking of the inn's hospitality.' 8
.eals are served in -a central dining hall. Third, the "housekeeping cabins"
where individual cabins-a thin board floor and wall with canvas top-are
furnished, containing a bedstead and small stove. The occupant must supply
his own linen, fire, and food. Fourth, the camping ground where only the
stove remains of the accommodations furnished in the housekeeping cabins.
17 Walling v. Potter, 35 Conn. 183 (1868). Ross v. Mellin, 36 Minn. 421,
32 N. W. 172 (1887). In Re Doubleday, 173 App. Div. 739, 159 N. Y. S. 947
(1916), req'o decree In Re Clyde's Estate, 155 N. Y. S. 621. A guest is a
transient person who resorts to an inn for accomodations. DeLapp v. Van
Closter, 136 Mo. App. 475, 118 S. W. 120 (1909); Holstein v. Phillip & Sims,
146 N. C. 366, 59 S. E. 1037 (1907). Originally it is said that the inn catered
to travelers and the lodging house to residents. McIntosh v. Schops, 92 Ore.
307, 180 Pac. 593 (1919). The fact that the traveler pays a rate provided
for residents is not conclusive of his guest status. Hall v. Pike, 100 Mass.
495 (1868). The guest need not register to establish his relationship. Heil
v. Memphis Hotel Co., 124 Tenn. 376, 136 S. W. 997 (1911).
18 "The universal rule seems to be that one cannot become a guest of a
hotel unless he procures some accomodation. He must procure a meal, room,
drink, feed for his horse, or at least offer to buy something of the innkeeper,
before he becomes a guest." Tulane Hotel Co. v. Holohan, 112 Tenn. 214,
79 S. W. 113 (1904).
In the ordinary case the traveler occupies his room, but he may 'use it
to dress rather than for sleeping. Lynar v. Mossop, 36 U. C. Q. B. 230 (1875).
A traveler who engages a room at an inn with no intention of occupying
it is not a guest. Bunn v. Johnson, 77 Mo. App. 596 (1898). It has been
held that-one who only purchases a drink at an inn is a guest. McDonald
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Certainly the ordinary automobile tourist is within this term
as it is commonly understood. Such a conclusion is strength-
ened by the liberal construction given by the courts. Res-
idents of a city in which an inn is located have been held such
when temporarily staying there, 19 guests have been held to
maintain their status as travelers even though remaining at
the inn for considerable periods of time.20
v. Edgerton, 5 Barb, 560 (N. Y. 1849); McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 316,
62 Am. Dec. 574 (1854-); Bennett v. Mellor, 5 T. R. 273 (K. B. 1793); cf. The
Queen v. Rymer, 2 Q. B. D. 136 (1877). But later cases have denied this.
Commonwealth v. Hagan, 140 Mass. 289, 3 N. E. 207 (1885); Commonwealth
v. Moore, 145 Mass. 244, 13 N. E. 893, (1887); Carpenter v. Taylor, 1 Hilt.
193 (N. Y. 1856); Gastenhofer v. Clair, 10 Daly 265 (N. Y. 1881). A traveler
who only dines at an inn has been held a guest. Bowell v. DeWald, 2 Ind.
App. 303, 28 N. E. 430 (1891); Hill v. Memphis Hotel Co., 124 Tenn. 376,
136 S. W. 997 (1911); McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 316, 62 Am. Dec. 574
(1854); Orchard v. Bush & Co., 2 Q. B. 284 (1898). But one who only
attends a special banquet or dance at an inn is not a guest. Carter v. Hobbs,
12 Mich. 52, 83 Am. Dec. 762 (1863); Amey v. Winchester, 68 N. H. 447,
39 At. 487 (1895); Fitch v. Casler, 17 Hun. 126 (N. Y. 1879). One who
only stables his horse at an inn has been held a guest. Russell v. Fagan, 7
Houst. 389, 8 At. 258 (Del. 1886); Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280, 20 Am.
Dec. 471 (Mass. 1830) ; McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 316, 62 Am. Dec. 574
(1854). But this holding has been denied. Brewer v. Caswell, 132 Ga. 563,
64 S. E. 674 (1909); Thickstun v. Howard, 8 Blackf. 535 (Ind. 1847); Healy v.
Gray, 68 Me. 489, 19 Am. Rep. 244 (1878); Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill 485,
38 Am. Dec. 663 (N. Y. 1842). One merely taking advantage of gratuitous
accommodations of a hotel is not a guest. Baker v. Bailey, 103 Ark. 12, 145
S. W. 532 (1912); Parker v. Dixon, 132 Minn. 367, 157 N. W. 583 (1916);
Arcade Hotel Co. v. Wiatt, 44 Ohio St. 32, 4 N. E. 398 (1886). One who
merely visits a guest at an inn is not a guest. Moody v. Kenney, 153 La.
1007, 97 So. 21 (1923). It has been held that one resorting to an inn for
an unlawful purpose is not a guest. Curtis v. Murphy, 63 Wis. 4, 22 N. W.
825 (1885).
19 Walling v. Potter, 35 Conn. 183 (1868). Hart v. Mills Hotel Trust,
144 Misc. 121, 258 N. Y. S. 417 (1932); Arcade Hotel Co. v. Wiatt, 44 Ohio
St. 32, 4 N. E. 398 (1886). "It is true that he (plaintiff) rented by the week
and that his home was in the city , but this fact alone is insufficient
to transform the status of the defendant from an innkeeper to landlord."
Babin v. Thormander -, La. -, 167 So. 241 (1936).
2o Persons staying at an inn for a period of several months may be guests
if their stay is temlorary or of indefinite duration. Hancock v. Rand, 94
N. Y. 1, 46 Am. Rep. 112 (1873); Metzger v. Schnabel, 23 Misc, 698, 52
N. Y. S. 105 (1898) ; Fisher v. Bonneville Hotel Co., 53 Utah 588, 188 Pac.
816 (1920). Admittedly the distinction is hard to make where the occupancy
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The requirements imposed upon the proprietor of an inn
are more difficult to ascertain and apply.2 ' Primarily it is
to be noted that the status of an innkeeper is to be judged
subjectively. 22  It is not conclusive that the proprietor may,
in his desire to avoid onerous responsibilities, declare his
establishment is not an inn. One cannot act as an innkeeper
and avoid the status by verbal denial of his actions. 2  The
label which is adopted for the enterprise is not controlling.
Advertising a place as a "hotel" is not conclusive that it is an
inn; 24 the "What Cheer House" has been held an inn.25 The
terms "hotel", "inn", and "tavern", while "of different
is of considerable time. The following cases should be compared with those
above. Smith v. Dorchester Hotel Co., 145 Wash. 344, 259 Pac. 1085 (1927);
Haff v. Adams, 6 Ariz. 395, 59 Pac. 111 (1899). Though one goes to an inn
originally as, a guest such status may be lost by becoming a resident. Crapo
v. Rockwell, 48 Misc. 1, 94- N. Y. S. 1122 (1905). Lamond v. Gordon Hotels,
Ltd. 1 Q. B. 541 (1897). See also infra note 30.
21 For definitions and distinguishing features of innkeepers, generally, see,
Birmingham Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Drennen, 175 Ala. 338, 57 So. 876
(1912); City of Independence v. Richardson, 117 Kan. 656, 232 Pac. 1044
(1925). At common law the innkeeper subject to extraordinary rules was the
"common innkeeper." Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 427 (K. B. 1701).
22 Compare Baldwin Piano Co. v. Congress Hotel, 24-3 I1. App. 118 (1926),
where a room was engaged for a year with the provision that the innkeeper-
guest relationship should prevail. It was held that the relation existed though
in the absence of the agreement it would not.
' The possession or absence of a license is not determinative of the innkeeper
status. Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. 163 (1865) ; Commonwealth v. Wether-
bee, 101 Mass. 214 (1869) ; but in the enforcement of a lien statute the posses-
sion of a license. may be a deciding element. Randall v. Tuell, 89 Me. 443,
36 Ad. 910 (1897). The fact that a register is kept at an establishment does
-not make it an inn. Roberts v. Case Hotel Co., 106 Misc. 481, 175 N. Y. S.
123 (1919).
2 3Howth v. Franklin, 20 Tex. 798, 73 Am. Dec. 218 (1858). A place
designated as a "boarding house" may be an inn. Re Brewster, 39 Misc. 689,
80 N. Y. S. 666 (1903).
24 Fay v. Pacific Improvement Co., 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. 1099, 28 Pac. 943
(1892). Nelson v. Johnson, 104- Minn. 440, 116 N. W. 828 (1908). Adver-
tising a place as a "hotel" has been relied upon as an important, though
inconclusive, factor in determining the innkeeper status. Johnson v. Chad-
bourn Finance Co., 89 Minn. 310, 94- N. W. 874 (1903).
25 Pinkerton v. Woodward, 23 Cal. 557, 91 Am. Dec. 657 (1867); same
as to "Elm House", Spring v. Hager, 145 Mass. 186, 13 N. E. 397 (1887).
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origin,2 1 are usually considered synonymous today.27  Con-
sequently it would appear that the use of the terms "tourist
home", "tourist cabin", or "camping ground" would be an
inconclusive distinction.
Of primary importance among the innkeepers requirements
is that there must be a holding out to receive all, to the ex-
tent of one's ability, who reasonably apply, who are in a
proper condition to be received, and who are able to pay a
reasonable charge.28  In exposition of this it is frequently
said that the lodging house keeper makes a special contract
with each lodger while the innkeeper does not.29 This is not
20For a discussion of the origin of each of these terms see Cromwell v.
Stephens, 2 Daly 15 (N. Y. 1867).
27 Waitt Construction Co. v. Chase, 197 App. Div. 327, 188 N. Y. S. 589
(1921); People v. Jones, 54 Barb 311 (N. Y. 1863); annotation, 19 A. L. R.
519 (1922); Goddard, Bailments and Carriers (2d ed. 1928) sec. 162.
28 Russell v. Fagan, 7 Houst. 389, 8 Atd. 258 (Del. 1886) ; Holstein v.
Phillips & Sims, 146 N. C. 366, 59 S. E. 1037 (1907); Hill v. Memphis Hotel
Co., 124 Tenn. 376, 136 S. W. 997 (1911); Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & AId. 283
(K. B. 1820). The lodging house keeper may select his patrons, the innkeeper
may not. Beall v. Beck, 3 Cranch C. C. 666 (U. S. 1829); Atlantic City v.
Hemsley, 76 N. J. L. 354, 70 AtI. 322 (1908). One who entertains strangers
only occasionally, though receiving compensation, is not an innkeeper. Kisten
v. Hildebrand, 9 B. Mon. 72, 48 Am. Dec. 416 (Ky. 1848). One who enter-
tained a circus troupe and occasionally transient guests is presumed an inn-
keeper. Commonwealth v. Wetherbee, 101 Mass. 214 (1869). The fact that
the house is not open all night does not bar the innkeeper status. Ibid. One
who keeps a house for all who choose to visit it and extends a general invita-
tion to the public is an innkeeper though the house is on enclosed ground.
Fay v. Pacific Improvement Co., 43 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. 1099, 28 Pac. 943 (1892).
Though the principal patrons are permanent residents it is an inn if there is
a holding out to receive all transients. Pettit v. Thomas, 103 Ark. 593, 148
S. W. 501 (1912). A private club is not an inn. Audubon Country Club v.
Commonwealth, 169 Ky. 399, 183 S. W. 911 (1916).
29Pettit v. Thomas, 103 Ark. 593, 148 S. W. 501 (1912); Wintermute v.
Clark, 7 N. Y. Super. Ct. (4 Duer) 146 (1851); Cromwell v. Stephens, 2
Daly 15 (N. Y. 1867); Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & AId. 283 (K. B. 1820).
The lodger is under an express contract for a certain time at a certain rate,
while the guest at the inn is entertained from day to day under an implied
contract. Willard v. Reinhardt, 2 E. D. Smith 148 (N. Y. 1853) ; McClaugherty
v. Cline, 128 Tenn. 605, 163 S. W. 801 (1913). "The guest comes without any
bargain for time, remains without one, and may go when he pleases, paying
only for the acutal entertainment which he receives." Shoecraft v. Bailey,
25 Ia. 553 (1868). The lodging house keeper has the right to select his guests
while the innkeeper does not. Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am.
Dec. 657 (1867); Commonwealth v. Cuncannon, 3 Brewst. 344 (Pa. 1869).
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literally accurate,3 0 but it does suggest that where the propri-
etor is making special inquiry as to the business, morals, etc.,
of applicants for his accommodations he is not undertaking
to deal with the public indiscriminately. The fact that fur-
nishin-g accommodations is only incidental to the principal
occupation of the proprietor or use of the premises is imma-
terial.3 1 However, persons have been excluded from the inn-
keeper status when acceptance of guests is a matter of
hospitality even though some compensation is charged. 32
The entertainment provided has often been a conclusive
factor in determining whether an establishment is an inn.33
Originally it appears to have been required that in addition
to providing sleeping quarters there should be liquor, food,
and stabling.34  As liquor and stabling ceased to be prime
necessities of the traveler they were abandoned as required
factors of the innkeeper status.3 5  Formerly it was considered
30 Persons taking a room at a weekly or monthly rate have been held guests.
Pettit v. Thomas, 103 Ark. 593, 148 S. W. 501 (1912); Gross v. Saratoga
European Hotel & Resort Co., 176 Ill. App. 160 (1912); Babin v. Thormander,
- La. -, 167 So. 241 (1936) ; R. L. Polk Co. v. Melenbacker, 136 Mich. 611,
99 N. W. 867 (1904); Fisher v. Bonneville Hotel Co., 55 Utah 588, 188 Pac.
856 (1920); annotation, 12 A. L. R. 26 (1921).
31 Fact that part of the building was a grocery is immaterial. Common-
wealth v. Wetherbee, 101 Mass. 214 (1869). By statute in Georgia it is
provided that, "Persons entertaining only a few individuals, or simply for
the accommodation of travelers, are not innkeepers, but depositaries for hire,
bound to ordinary diligence." Code of Georgia (1933) sec 52-102.
32 This result was in instances where householders in sparsely settled
country accommodated travelers where there was no other place that they
might stay. Lyon v. Smith, Morris, Iowa 184- (1843); Howth v. Franklin,
20 Tex. 798, 73 Am. Dec. 218 (1858). A hospital, primarily for care of the
sick, is not an inn though otherwise apparently meeting the requirements of
such. Hull Hospital Inc. v. Wheeler, 216 Iowa 1394, 250 N. W. 637 (1933).
33 "And I take the true definition of an inn to be, a house where the
traveler is furnished with everything which he has occasion for whilst upon
his jouurney." Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & AId. 283 X-B.-1820). The inn
should provide those things which the traveler has occasion to use. Dickeson
v. Rogers, 23 Tenn. (4 Hump.) 179, 40 Am. Dec. 642 (1843).
84Johnson v. Chadbourn Finance Co., 89 Minn. 310, 94 N. W. 874 (1903).
Nelson v. Johnson, 104 Minn. 440, 116 N. W. 828 (1908).
35 As the inn must supply the needs of the traveler then as his needs
become fewer, as in the use of the horse, the definition of an inn is modified.
Fay v. Pacific Improvement Co., 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. 1099, 28 Pac. 943 (1892);
Johnson v. Chadbourn Finance Co., 89 Minn. 310, 94 N. W. 874 (1903).
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not .only essential that food should be provided 6 but that the
innkeeper should be the vitualer.3 7 Certainly the require-
ment of single'proprietorship over food and lodging has been
abandoned 38 and perhaps even the requirement of food itself
in view of its general accessibility.3 9 The more recent cases
have so stated, although. there are sufficient decisions to the
contrary to render the question doubtful.
Does the proprietor of the new tourist establishments meet
these requirements? Apparently his advertisements purport
Stable is not essential. Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & Aid. 283, (K. B. 1820);
Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B. Mon. 72, 48 Am. Dec. 416 (Ky. 1848); Common-
wealth v. Wetherbee, 101 Mass. 214 (1869) ; cf. "Every innkeeper shall keep
good entertainment for man and horse." Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes
(1936) Tit. 37, sec. 31. Liquor is not necessary. Cunningham v. Philip, 12
Times L. R. 352 (Q. B. D. 1896) ; Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91
Am. Dec. 657 (1867); Curtis v. State, 5 Ohio (5 Ham.) 324 (1832).
36 Cromwell v. Stephens, 2 Daly 15 (N. Y. 1867); Kelly v. N. Y. Excise
Com'rs., 54 How. Prac. 327 (N. Y. 1877); Dixon v. Robbins, 246 N. Y. 169,
158 N. E. 63 (1927), but see comment on latter case infra note 65.
37Kopper v. Willis, 9 Daly 460 (N. Y. 1881); Cochrane v. Schryver, 12
Daly 174 (N. Y. 1883).
38 Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. Dec. 657 (1857); Johnson
v. Chadbourn Finance Co., 89 Minn. 310, 94 N. W. 874 (1903); Metzler v.
Terminal Hotel Co., 135 Mo. App. 410, 115 S. W. 1037 (1908).
39Metzler v. Terminal Hotel Co., 135 Mo. App. 410, 115 S. W. 1037
(1909) ; Kanelles v. Lock, 12 Ohio App. 210 (1919); Huntley v. Stanchfield,
168 Wis. 119, 169 N. W. 276 (1918). Quaere: Johnson v. Chadbourn Finance
Co., 89 Minn. 310, 94 N. W. 874 (1903). "In early days and under primitive
conditions it was necessary, in order to bring a place within the legal definition
of an inn-that lodging, food, drink, and stabling should be furnished to
travelers. But as cities grew, and modes of living, travel, and transportation
of persons changed, the legal definition of an inn was modified thereby, and
a bar to supply the guests with drink and a stable for the care of their horses
are now no longer essential requisites of an inn. Why, then, should a dining
room, or cafe, or a restaurant to supply guests with food, be now held an
essential requisite of an inn or hotel? The reason for so holding that the
supplying of guests with food is necessary requisite of an inn has as effectually
ceased as it has with reference to drink and stabling." Nelson v. Johnson,
104 Minn. 440, 116 N. W. 828 (1908).
In some statutory definitions of inns and hotels the requirement of serving
food is omitted. Revised Staatutes of Illinois (1935) Cahill ed. c. 70, par. 6;
Code of Iowa (1935) sec. 2808; Revised Code of Montana (1935) sec 2485;
Throckmorton's Ohio Code (1936) sec. 843-1; Vernon's Texas Statutes (1936)
sec 4596. Some statutes expressly require meals to be served. Revised Statutes
of Kansas (1923) sec. 36-101; Compiled General Laws of Florida (1927)
sec. 3353.
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dealings with the public generally. 40 He seldom expresses
interest in his guests other than that of mercenary character.
Though the revenue from tourists is frequently only incidental
to his regular business his open door policy is motivated by
other considerations than Christian brotherhood. If serving
of food is still essential then perhaps a majority of tourist
homes and cabins can be nothing more than lodging houses,
but, as stated, there is a trend against this requirement.
The process followed thus far, of objectively matching
accepted definitions against new situations, is not entirely
trustworthy. There are examples, within the law of inn-
keepers, that the judicial mind does not always so operate;
that enterprises technically within such definitions have been
excluded from the classification. 41
The most outstanding example of this is with regard to
sleeping cars where with considerable uniformity it has been
held that they are not inns.42 Obviously there are many
40 In regard to tourist homes it has been stated that the only question as
to their status as inns is whether there is a sufficient holding out to deal with
the public generally. Brown, Personal Property (1936) p. 440.
41 "We may not look solely to old definitions when we determine the
meaning of a word which must be applied under changed conditions." Dixon
v. Robbins, 246 N. Y. 169, 158 N. E. 63 (1927).
42 Blum v. Southern Pullman Palace Car Co., 1 Flip 500, (C.C.R. 1876);
Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Adams, 120 Ala. 581, 24 So. 921 (1898); Pull-
man Palace Car Co. v. Freudenstein, 3 Colo. App. 540, 34 Pac. 578 (1893) ;
Kates v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 95 Ga. 810, 23 S.E. 186 (1896); Pullman
Palace Car Co. v. Hall, 106 Ga. 765, 32 S.E. 923 (1899); Pullman Palace
Car Co. v. Smith, 73 I1. 360, 24 Am. Rep. 258 (1874); Woodruff Sleeping &
Parlor Car Co. v. Diehl, 84 Ind. 474, 43 Am. Rep. 102 (1882); Pullman
Palace Car Co. v. Gaylord, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 279 (1884); Whicher v. Boston
& A. R. R., 176 Mass. 275, 57 N. E. 601 (1900); Welch v. Pullman Palace
Car Co., 16 Abb. Pr. 352 (N.Y. 1884); Illinois Central R.R. v. Handy, 63
Misc. 609, 56 Am. Rep. 846 (N.Y. 1886); Garrett v. Southern Ry. Co., 172
N.C. 737, 90 S.E. 903 (1916); Fall River & M. Co. v. Pullman Palace Car Co.,
6 Ohio Dec. 85 (1896); Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Gardner, 3 Penny 84
(Pa. 1883); Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Gavin, 93 Tenn. 53, 23 S.W. 70
(1893); Darga'n v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 2 Wills 691 (Tex. 1885); Pull-
man C6. v. Hatch, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 303, 70 S.W. 771 (1902). Contra:
Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Lowe, 28 Neb. 239, 44 N.W. 226 (1889); Sise
v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 1 Quebec Super. Ct. 9 (1892). Notice that in
note 46 infra the New York and Illinois courts have held passenger boats
to be inns while denying that status to the sleeping car.
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distinctions between the Pullman car and the inn, but when
we attempt to apply to it the definitions and requirements
of an inn it would appear that there is a close conformity.
There is a holding out to serve all, the furnishing of lodging,
and even meals are provided, though ordinarily under a dif-
ferent'management. The fact that the traveler on the Pull-
man also receives transportation would seem immaterial, yet
the courts have been content to say that a sleeping car is not
an inn. The distinctions which have been suggested are
obviously fallible. The fact that the sleeping car company
does not furnish food has been stated43 with a disregard for
the fact that this requirement has long been abandoned in
the case of recognized inns.44  The fact that the sleeping car
company accommodates only those which the railroad will
carry is a thin distinction in view of the fact that the obliga-
tions of the carrier and innkeeper to serve are practically
identical.45
This same tendency to ignore the exact words of the defini-
tion has been noted in attempts to classify passenger boats
as inns. 46  It has been stated as sufficient reason for denying
the classification that the court knew of no decision declaring
a boat to be an inn.47  A few cases have held hotels at sum-
mer resorts and watering places not to be inns because of their
seasonal operation.48
43 Garrett v. Southern R. Co., 172 N.C. 737, 90 S.E. 903 (1916).
44 See supra note 38.
45 As to whether sleeping cars should be held inns, see Beale, Inn-Keepers
and Hotels (1906) p. 236f; cf. Elliot, Bailments and Carriers (1914) p. 116.
46 Steamships are not inns. Clark v. Burns, 118 Mass. 275, 19 Am. Rep.
456 (1875). Contra: St. George v. Hamburg-American Line, 198 Ill. App.
96 (1916); Adams v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 151 N.Y. 163, 45 N.E. 369
(1896). By statute steamboats have been classified with inns, "hotel, inn or
steamboat." Cahill's Consolidated Laws of New Jersey (1930) C. 21, see. 200.
471. . . We have heard of no case in which the principles of law
governing innkeepers have been eXtended to steamboat operators . . .
The Crystal Palace v. Vanderpool, 16 B. Mon. 302 (Ky. 1855).
48 Parkhurst v. Foster, 1 Salk. 387, (K.B. 1699); Bonner v. Welborn, 7
Ga. 296 (1849). Contra: Willis v. McMahon, 89 Cal. 156, 26 Pac. 649 (1891) ;
Holstein v. Phillips & Sims, 146 N.C. 366, 59 S.E. 1037 (1907); McCaugherty
v. Cline, 128 Tenn. 605, 163 S.W. 801 (1913). A hospital, though apparently
meeting the requirements of an inn, has been held not to be such. Hull
Hospital Inc. v. Wheeler, 216 Iowa 1394, 250 N.W. 637 (1933).
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The objective process of testing the tourist home and cabin
upon a definition patterned from parts of decisions fails to
give proper consideration to the subjective nature of the
problem. The fact that to a large extent the new tourist
accommodations are competing with inns and hotels for the
patronage of travelers 49 suggests that physical differences are
immaterial and that in fairness they should enjoy the same
rights and be subject to the same burdens. 0 Undoubtedly
this competitive factor has influenced the courts to abandon
the requirements of stabling, liquor, a dining room under the
innkeeper's management, and perhaps even the dining room
itself.51
Opposed, at least partially, to this argument is the con-
sideration of the necessity and reason for the continuance of
the extraordinary rights and duties of innkeepers. Sub-
consciously, if not expressly, judges will be influenced accord-
4 9
"Many camps now have the appearance of a modern hotel with apart-
ments consisting of bedroom, dining room, bath and with garage handy.
Adjacent to the apartments will be found a restaurant, a motion picture place,
a swimming pool and park to complete the attractions." The Highway
Magazine, Dec., 1931, p. 314. Present trend is to heat cabins in order
that they may be available the year round. One camp in Iowa furnishes
portable typewriters and is so popular with salesmen that they make reserva-
tion two and three weeks in advance. Hardware Age, Apr. .11, 1935,
p. 46f. A survey of 101 motoring parties showed that 57 stopped at hotels,
39 at cabins or tourist homes, and 5 carried their own camping equipment.
Another survey of expenditures of 1262 motoring parties showed that they
spent at hotels, exclusive of meals, $13,586, at tourist camps $11,321. Tour-
ist News, Sept., 1935. Hotel journals have spoken highly of accommoda-
tions offered in tourist cabins, particularly in the southwest. Hotel Man-
agement, 1930, p. 543 ff. One hotel in Indiana advertises "accommoda-
tions similar to auto camps." The Architectural Record, Dec., 1933, p. 457.
Against the tourist cabin competition the hotels are defenseless. Many have
gone over to the enemy's camp by furnishing cottage accommodations and
only serving meals in the hotel. Business Week, Feb. 8, 1936, p. 31. For
other information as to the extent of the business, see supra note 1.
50"It may be that under changing conditions the common-law liability
of an innkeeper may be extended by analogy and compelling logic of parti-
cular facts to cases where at common law the person sought to be charged
with that liability was not an innkeeper." Dixon v. Robbins, 246 N.Y.' 169,
158 N.E. 63 (1927).
51This is expressed or implied in practically all cases cited supra in
notes 35 and 38.
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ing to their opinions of the necessity of protecting both the
tourist and host or whether today innkeeper rules are an
impractical burden. It has been stated that the need of pro-
tection is still present, 52 but certainly the conditions originally
giving rise to the need are hardly to be recognized today.
Traveling in early England was not only adventurous but
dangerous. Brigands were an accepted hazard. At night-
fall the traveler seldom had a selection of hostelries. He
needs must pray that he will be accepted at the inn and if
accepted pray that he is not in a den of thieves. The govern-
ment had small concern with the traveler's problems. Rob-
bery and personal violence were largely treated as purely
civil matters.5 3
It is true that travelers are robbed today and probably
some tourist homes and cabins are merely fronts for more
nefarious practices, but the motoring tourist of today is sel-
dom left to a Hobson's choice of accommodations, nor is the
opportunity of injury and robbery much greater than in his
own home. Probably the law of innkeepers originated as a
feeble attempt to aid the traveler's self protection, but it is
doubtful if today the tourist determines upon his journey
influenced by the soothing thought of the protection afforded
by the law of innkeepers. It is further doubtful if the inn-
keeper is restrained from wrong or motivated to improve his
establishment by fear of his extraordinary liability. Certain-
ly the widespread statutory modification of the law of inn-
keepers sanctions this argument. Probably the same thought
has played a subconscious part in determining that Pullman
cars, boats, and summer hotels were not inns.54
52 Nelson v. Johnson, 104 Minn. 440, 116 N.W. 828 (1908); Hulett v.
Swift, 33 N.Y. 571, 88 Am. Dec. 405 (1865); Goddard, Bailments & Carriers
(2d ed. 1928) sec. 161.
53 For a history of early conditions confronting the traveler, see Crapo
v. Rockwell, 48 Misc. 1, 94 N.Y.S. 1122 (1903) ; Beale, Innkeepers and Hotels
(1906) pp. 3-5; Goddard, Bailments and Carriers (2d ed. 1928) sec. 161.
54 "Innkeepers, in the true sense of that term, are rare in modern times
and are progressively diminishing." Ford v. Waldorf System, Inc., - R.I. -,
188 Ad. 633 (1936). The "peculiar liability of the innkeeper is one of great
rigor and should not be extended beyond proper limits." Pullman Palace Car
Co. v. Smith, 73 I1. 360, 24 Am. Rep. 258 (1874).
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STATUTES5 5
If it is concluded that tourist homes and cabins are within
the realm of innkeepers a further search must be made to
determin6 the statutory modification of the common law gen-
erally and the application of such enactments to the new
situation. Even if it be determined that these new tourist
accommodations are not within the common law classifica-
tion, a careful examination of so-called innkeeper statutes is
still essential as many of these laws deal with persons not
innkeepers at common law, but who in some manner are en-
gaged in providing sleeping accommodations.56
' The object of most of these statutes may be grouped
roughly under four headings: (1) Those dealing with
licensing provisions; (2) those imposing health and safety
regulations; (3) those limiting liability for loss of goods;
(4) those providing a statutory lien. These enactments do
not read, "The common law of innkeepers is hereby
amended", but those affected are described with varying de-
grees of particularity.
First, there are the statutes which attempt to describe
definitely those subject to its provisions: -
"Every building-used-or advertised-to the public to be an inn,
hotel, or public lodging house or place where sleeping accommodations
are furnished for hire to transient guests, whether with or without meals,
in which five or more rooms are used for the accommodation of such
transient guests-for the purpose of this act shall be deemed to be a
hotel." 57
55A complete survey of all state legislation is not attempted, only an
amount sufficient for illustration. Delaware appears to be the only state hav-
ing made no changes in the common law of innkeepers.
56Due to the recent origin of the new tourist accommodations few "inn-
keeper" statutes expressly refer to them. Vermont requires registers to be
kept by a "hotel, inn, lodging house, or roadside camp or cabin. ' Public
Laws of Vermont (1933) sec. 8189. See also notes 76 and 77 infra.
57Revised Code of Montana (1935) sec. 2485. See also General Laws
of State of California (1931) Acts 8548, sec. 10; Revised Statutes of Illinois
(1935) (Cahill ed.) c. 70, par. 6; Throckmorton's Ohio Code (1936) see.
843-1. "Hotels and other structures two-stories high, with ten or more sleep-
ing rooms, where sleeping accommodations are furnished to the public . . ."
etc. Mason's Minnesota Statutes (1927) sec. 5895, 5896. Some statutes,
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Second, some statutes apparently attempt to achieve inclu-
siveness by using a variety of terms such as "hotel", "inn",
"bdarding-house", and "lodging-house keepers". 58
Third, there is the statute employing only the common law
term "inn". 5"
Fourth, there is the statute which uses only the term
"hotel". 60
Due to the diversity of language used in different states,
and even within the same state, conclusions generally as to
the effect af such statutes upon tourist homes and cabins are
impossible. Again this paper must resort to generalities and
be content with broad suggestions and considerations which
may influence the application.
Under the first type of statute suggested above the appar-
ent exactness of the definition would imjly an equally strict
application. In the case of the tourist home a counting of
rooms devoted to use would be the apparent test. In the
case of the camping ground the absence of a building would
be conclusive. To apply the statute to five or more cabins
similar to that stated in the text expressly require meals to be served. Re-
vised Statutes of Kansas (1923) sec. 36-101; Compiled General Laws of
Florida (1927) sec. 3353.
58Revised Code of Arizona (1928) sec. 2038; Compiled General Laws
of Florida (1927) sec. 5375; Code of Georgia (1933) see. 52-105; Burns'
Indiana Statutes (1933) sec. 37-205, 37-206, 48-1407 cf. 39; Carrolls' Ken-
tucky Statutes (8th ed. Baldwin Revision 1936) sec. 3058-2; Revised Statutes
of Maine (1930) c. 36 sec. 11, 15; Revised Code of Montana (1935) sec.
7675; Cahill's Consolidated Laws of New Jersey (1930) c. 21. sec. 207;
Throckmorton's Ohio Code (1936) sec. 4785-59; Code of Tennessee (1932)
see. 8012; Vernon's Texas Statutes (1936) sec. 4592; Virginia Code (1936)
sec. 1502; West Virginia Code (1932) sec. 3921.
59 Revised Code of Arizona (1928) sec. 2041; Carrolls' Kentucky Statutes
(8th ed. Baldwin Revision 1936) sec. 2176; Revised Statutes of Maine (1930)
c. 36, sec. 1, 5; Revised Code of Montana (1935) sec. 7673, 7674; Cahill's
Consolidated Laws of New Jersey (1930) c. 41, see. 514; Throckmorton's
Ohio Code (1936) see. 5981, 5984; Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes (1936)
Tit. 37, sec. 31.
60 Digest of Statutes of Arkansas (1919) sec. 2849, 7112; Compiled General
Laws of Florida (1927) sec. 37758; Revised Statutes of Illinois (1935) Cahill
ed. c. 70, para. 1, 2; Burns' Indiana Statutes (1933) sec. 37-101, 42-1301,
42-1302; Code of Iowa (1935) sec. 1536; Revised Statutes of Kansas (1923)
sec. 58-208; Cahill's Consolidated Laws of New Jersey (1930) c. 21, sec.
201, c. 46, sec. 355; West Virginia Code (1932) sec. 1366.
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the court must either ignore the singular use of the term
"building" or look upon the cabins as a single rather than
separate units.600 Some statutes, similar to the one under
consideration, do not require a certain number of rooms in
the building and consequently there would be less difficulty
in holding tourist cabins within their scope."'
The application of the second type of statute suggested
above may turn largely upon the court's approach. If each
term that is used is examined separately, it is quite possible
to conclude that the tourist accommodation is not within its
meaning.6 2  However, it would appear more in accord with
the object of the enactment to view the terms as a unit. The
apparent employment of all known terms describing those eri-
gaged in furnishing sleeping accommodations suggests strong-
ly that all persons engaged in such business were to be
affected. 3 The apparent attempt to avoid technical lines
should influence a liberal construction. The absence of the
terms "tourist home" and "tourist cabin" would appear due
60% If the court attempts a literal construction of "building" it may draw a
distinction between cabins arranged in a row having a partition wall and
a continuous roof and those cabins separated from each other by a few inches.
61 Code of Tennessee (1932) sec. 5275. "'Hotel' shall mean any building
or structure equipped, used, advertised as, or held out to the public to be an
inn, hotel, or public lodging house or place where sleeping accommodations
are furnished transient guests for hire, whether with or without meals."
Code of Iowa (1935) sec. 2808. "Every building or structure, or any part
thereof, kept, used as, maintained as, or advertised as, or held out to the
public to be a place where accommodations are furnished to the public whether
with or without meals and furnishing accommodations for periods of less
than one week shall for the purpose of this act be deemed an hotel." Mason's
Minnesota Statutes (1927) sec. 5903.
62 A hospital was held not within a lien statute applying to an "inn, room-
ing house, and eating house or any structure where rooms and board are
furnished whether to permanent or transient occupants." Hull Hospital, Inc.
v. Wheeler, 216 Iowa 1394, 250 N.W. 637 (1933).
63 Some statutes use in addition to the terms mentioned some catch-all:
"or place of entertainment for transient or permanent guests or lodgers."
Burns' Indiana Statutes (1933) see. 37-301; "or any structure where rooms
or board are furnished." Code of Iowa (1935) sec. 10348-9; "and keepers
of houses of private entertainment." Carrolls' Kentucky Staatutes (8th ed.
Baldwin Revision 1936) sec. 2179a-1; "'or house of private entertainment.'
Virginia Code (1936) sec. 6444.
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only to the fact that such terms were unknown at the time
of the statute's enactment.
In those statutes which employ only the term "inn" or
"innkeeper" logic may suggest application only to those fall-
ing within the legal definition of such persons or establish-
ments at common law. "Inn" has not been a term of common
use for considerable time. Its appearance in legislation
indicates a studied attempt to amend or supplement the com-
mon law rules on that subject and, equally important, only
those rules.
Where "hotel" is the sole description of the scope of the
enactment, our problem becomes more complicated. Cer-
tainly "hotel", standing alone, does not have the sense of
broadness conveyed by those statutes referring to "every
structure for the accommodation of travelers" or to "a hotel,
lodging house, rooming house or boarding house." It would
appear logical that at least the statute under consideration
was restricted to those who are innkeepers at common law,
but does it include all such innkeepers? It has been previous-
ly stated that "hotel" and "inn" are synonymous, and it is
possible that the Gordian knot may be cut upon this premise, 64
but it is to be remembered that the decisions declaring such
identity of meaning were considering only the effect of the
particular label which a proprietor attached to his establish-
ment so far as his status as an innkeeper was concerned.6 5
In common understanding it is doubtful if "hotel" is as inclu-
sive as "inn"; certainly the former term conveys a more
64 Some statutes use the terms together, "innkeeper and hotel keeper" or
"inn and hotel." Digest of Statutes of Arkansas (1919) sec. 5559-5562, 5564-
5568; Revised Statutes of Maine (1930) c. 36, sec. 14; Cahill's Consolidated
Laws of New Jersey (1930) c. 7, sec. 40; Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes
(1936) Tit. 37, sec. 61, 6% 71; Code of Tennessee (1932) sec. 6680; Public
Laws of Vermont (1933) sec. 8184, 8192-8195, 8648.
65 See notes supra 24-27. In Dixon v. Robbins, 246 N.Y. 169, 158 N.E.
63 (1927) the court states that "inn" and "hotel" are recognized as synonymous,
but in iolding the establishment in question-see note 75-not within a statute
applying to "hotels" the court avoids saying whether it was a common law
inn.
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definite picture to the mind.66 The entire dispute would ap-
pear to turn upon whether the term is used in a technical
sense, whether it is a genus or species.
Previously, in applying the common law definition of inn-
keepers to tourist homes and cabins, it was suggested that
the objective matching of definitive words was not the only
test applied by the courts. The same is true in attempting
to apply the words of a statute to new situations similar to,
but in many respects distinguishable from, the class of affected
things named. Thus, is an electric interurban line a "rail-
road" or an airplane a "motor vehicle"? Such cases illustrate
the difficulty of applying the words of statutes to newly
created situations. It has been suggested as a rule of statu-
tory construction that:
"Where a statute deals with a genus, and the thing which afterwdrds
comes into existence is a species thereof, the language of the statute will
generally be extended to the species, although it was not known and
could not have been contemplated by the legislature when the act was
passed; but where the statute shows plainly that the word is not used as
describing the whole genus put forward as applicable to the case, but
only some species thereof, the rule has no application."167
While perhaps pleasing to the ear such a rule is too flaccid
for application.
66 It has been recognized that the term "hotel" standing alone in a statute
is not necessarily to be interpreted as a common law inn. ". . . the term
'hotel' is not applicable to a building, maintained as . . . the defendant's
building . . ., with few, if any, of those characteristics which mark a
'hotel' or 'inn' as understood . . . in . . . common speech." Dixon v.
Robbins, 246 N.Y. 169, 158 N.E. 63 (1927). In holding an ordinance apply-
ing to "hotels" was not applicable to an establishment furnishing lodging to
impecunious transients at 25c a night, it was said, ". . . it is not what is
strictly known as a hotel." Cromwell v. Stephens, 2 Daly 15 (N.Y. 1867).
67 55 C.J. 973f (1932). "If the language used is broad enough to include
things not yet known but which may , afterwards come into being, then they
too are included, but the terms used must be comprehensive enough to include
them." Franklin & P. Ry. Co. v. Shoemaker's Committee, 156 Va. 619, 159
S.E. 100 (1931). ". . . things not existing at the time of the enact-
ment of a law may be held to be within its terms in cases dealing with
a genus of things." Pellish Brothers v. Cooper, 47 Wyo. 480, 38 Pac. (2d)
607, 608 (1934).
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Even in statutes clearly referring to a genus some courts
have shied at including a new species when it is dissimilar-
to the mental picture portrayed by the legislative descrip-
tion.68 As Justice Holmes said in regard to airplanes being
classed as "motor vehicles":
"When a rule of conduct is laid down in words that evoke in the
common mind only the picture of vehicles moving on land, the statute
should not be extended to aircraft simply because it seems to us that a
similar policy applies, or upon the speculation that if the Legislature
had thought of it, very likely broader words would have been used." 69
The word picture conveyed by statutory language may be
vague. It is doubtful if many courts apply the rule even
when the picture is clear. "Telegraph", has been held to in-
clude "telephone". 70 Considerable diversity of opinion has
been demonstrated as to whether "railroad" statutes include
electric interurban lines 7" and whether "locomotives" include
6 8 1n determining whether women were qualified as jurymen as being
"+voters" after the 19th Amendment, it has been said: "Those words, however,
like the words of every statute, are not to be interpreted in their simple literal
meaning, but in connection with the history of the times and the entire sys-
tem of which it forms a part, in the light of the Constitution, of the common
law, and of previous legislation upon the same subject." Re Opinion of
Justices, 237 Mass. 591, 130 N.E. 685 (1921).
69 McBoyle v. U. S., 283 U. S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L. Ed. 816 (1931).
"There is always a tendency to construe statutes in the light in which they
appear when the construction is given. . . . But in endeavoring to as-
certain what the Congress of 1862 intended, we must, as far as possible, place
ourselves in the light that Congress enjoyed, look at things as they appeared
to it, and discover its purpose from the language used in connection with the
surrounding circumstances." Platt v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 99 U.S. 48,
63, 25 L. Ed. 424 (1878).
70The distinction between the two is referred to as a "slight technical
difference." Northwestern Telephone Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.,
76 Minn. 334, 79 N.W. 315 (1899).
71 Yes, Campbell v. Greenville, S. & A. Ry. Co., 97 S.C. 383, 81 S.E.
676 (1914). No, Bohmer's Admx. v. Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co.,
212 Ky. 524, 279 S.W. 955 (1925); Stem v. Nashville Interurban Ry., 142
Tenn. 494, 221 S.W. 192 (1920); Shortino v. Salt Lake & U. R. Co., 52
Utah 476, 174 Pac. 860 (1918). A statute of 1889 as to "transportation
companies", was held applicable to taxi cab companies. Commonwealth v.
Quaker City Cab Co., 287 Pa. 161, 134 At. 404 (1926). Authority given a
city to regulate "garages" was construed to mean public garages and the
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electric and gasoline propelled engines. 72 It is doubtful if a
further discussion of this problem by analogy to other situa-
tions will prove fruitful.73  A more careful consideration of
each case might partially relieve the objective confusion. As
stated in regard to whether the new tourist proprietors were
innkeepers at common law, undoubtedly the determination of
the problem will be influenced by a consideration of the pur-
pose of the statute and the necessity and practicality of ap-
plying it to the new situation.74 Thus, it is doubtful if a
statute requiring "hotels" to have fire escapes or rope lad-
fact that there was a subsequent need for regulation of private garages hous-
ing five or more cars is immaterial. Crerar Clinch Coal Co. v. City of
Chicago, 341 Il. 471, 173 N.E. 484 (1930).
72 No, Franklin & P. Ry. Co. v. Shoemaker's Committee, 156 Va. 619,
159 S.E. 100 (1931); Hudson v. S. W. Mo. R. Co., 173 Mo. App. 611, 159
SW. 9 (1918); Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Day, 120 Miss. 296, 82 So. 148
(1919).
7 In statutes dealing with the "practice of medicine" or "treatment of
disease" considerable diversity of opinion has arisen as to application to
persons other than the orthodox M.D. As to Christian Science practitioners:
Yes, State v. Bushwell, 40 Neb. 158, 58 N.W. 728 (1894). No, State v.
Mylod, 20 R.I. 632, 40 Atl. 753 (1898). As to osteopaths: Yes, Bragg v.
State, 134 Ala. 165, 32 So. 767 (1902); Little v. State, 60 Neb. 749, 84 N.W.
248 (1900). As to chiropodists: No, State v. Armstrong, 38 Idaho 493, 225
Pac. 491 (1923). As to dentists: No, State, ex rel. v. Fisher, 119 Mo. 344,
24 S.W. 167 (1893). As to chiropracters: Yes, Louisiana State Board of
Medicine v. Fife, 162 La. 681, 111 So. 58 (1926). An exemption statute of
1886 applying to "tools, team and implements, or stock in trade" was held
to include the automobile of a taxi driver. Pellish Brothers v. Cooper, 47
Wyo. 480, 38 Pac. (2d) 607 (1934). For conflicting cases on this, see 28
A.L.R. 74 (1924). Dispute has arisen as to whether women, since the 19th
amendment, are eligible for jury service as "qualified voters." Yes, Com-
monwealth v. Maxwell, 271 Pa. 378, 114 At. 825 (1921). No, Re Opinion
of Justices, 237 Mass. 591, 130 N.E. 685 (1921); Commonwealth v. Welosky,
276 Mass. 398, 177 N.E. 656 (1931). As to whether a bank stockholder's
double liability law applies to banks of discount and deposit as distinguished
from banks of issue and circulation when the latter was the common type
of bank at the time of the law's adoption: Yes, Gaiser v. Buck, 203 Ind.
9, 174 N.E. 83, 179 N.E. 1 (1931). No, Allen v. Clayton, 63 Iowa 11, 18
N.W. 663 (1884).
74 A statute granting liens to "hotels", defined to include "inn, rooming
house, and eating house, or any structure where rooms and board are furnished
to permanent or transient occupants" was held not to include a hospital.
Hull Hospital, Inc. v. Wheeler, 216 Iowa 1394, 250 N.W. 637 (1933).
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ders will be applied to tourist cabins, 75 but, on the other
hand, we would not be shocked at a decision which stated that
a register of guests should be kept because such was required
under a statute applying to "hotels". The propriety of ap-
plying these statutes is not always so obvious, as in the case
of those providing for licenses, limited liability and liens.
CONCLUSION
An appropriate title for this paper would be "A Tempest
in a Teapot." Nothing more has been attempted other than
to ask questions, suggest answers and then criticize them.
Sometimes it is by such fumbling methods that the law pro-
gresses. If this paper has suggested some of the major prob-
lems which may arise and the logic underlying possible
answers, it is believed that for the present we should not ven-
ture further. The only conclusion which may be forecast is
that in view of the variety of possible questions and equal
variety of possible answers a uniformity of judicial solution
is hardly to be expected.
The questions which the new tourist accommodations
present are not of pressing social or economic importance and
will probably never become issues of the day. It is in such
situations that legislation may do much to anticipate difficul-
75 A statute requiring fire escapes on "hotels" was held inapplicable to an
establishment furnishing only sleeping accommodations to transients. "The
statute construed according to its letter and spirit does not apply to such a
building." Dixon v. Robbins, 246 N.Y. 169, 158 N.E. 63 (1927). Such rea-
soning was demonstrated where a city ordinance fixed the water rates for
"hotels" according to the number of rooms. The court held it inapplicable
to an establishment furnishing lodging to travelers where part of the rooms
were not and could not be supplied with water; the court said, ". . . it
is not such an establishment as could have been contemplated . . , as it is
not to be supposed that there was an intention to tax a man for all the lodging
rooms of a building if water could not be supplied to them, and he is com-
pelled to obtain it elsewhere." Cromwell v. Stephens, 2 Daly 15 (N.Y.
1867). In determining whether "locomotive engines" includes electric and
gasoline engines courts, in answering in the negative, have been influenced
by the impracticality of requiring such engines to be equipped with a steam
whistle, as required by the statute. Libby v. New York, N. H. & H. R.
Co., 273 Mass. 522, 174 N.E. 171 (1930); Franklin & P. Ry. Co. v. Shoe-
maker's Committee, 156 Va. 619, 159 S.E. 100 (1931).
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ties by providing a few rules which will in most instances
provide an equitable disposition of problems. Statutes which
fix the right of the proprietor to a lien upon the goods of his
guest70 and clarify his liability for loss of such goods may
be easily drafted and will determine the majority of conflicts
which arise. Rules of safety and general health provided for
the ordinary hotel are frequently impractical in application
to the tourist home and cabin. No doubt those states which
have placed the determination of such matters under the au-
thority of the state board of health are finding a satisfactory
solution.7 7
70This has been done in Florida. Compiled General Laws of Florida
(1927) sec. 4149.
77 Compiled General Laws of Florida (1927) sec. 4144, Revised Code of
Montana (1935) sec. 2454.2; Revised Statutes of Maine (1930) c. 36, sec. 28, 29.
